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"A WELL REGULATED MILITIA": THE SECOND
AMENDMENT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
PAUL FINKELMAN*
A well regulated Militia, composed of gentlemen freeholders, and
other freemen, is the natural strength and only stable security of a
free Government.
-George Mason,
The history of the Second Amendment is rooted in English
conflicts between the king and his people. It involves the relationship
between the standing army and the militias during and after the
English Civil War. It also involves the struggles of the colonists
against the Crown before and during the Revolution.
This English background is useful, and certainly interesting, but
the history of the drafting and adoption of the Second Amendment
emerges out of far more immediate events. The failure of the
national government under the Articles of Confederation prompted
the call for a convention to revise the Articles.
While American leaders were contemplating calling a convention
to revise the Articles, violent resistance to traditional law
enforcement-most notably Shays's Rebellion in Massachusettsunderscored the sense of crisis that many Americans felt. Farmers
led by Captain Daniel Shays marched on local courthouses in western
Massachusetts, shutting down the courts and intimidating judges and
others. Eventually militia companies from eastern Massachusetts
dispersed Shays and his followers.
The delegates to the Philadelphia Convention met with this
event fresh in their memories and with the knowledge that the
government under the Articles of Confederation would probably be
* Chapman Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law. I thank
my assistant, Rita Langford, and my research assistant, Elizabeth Sheridan, for their help on this
Article. I presented an earlier version of this Article at Lewis and Clark Law School, the Ohio
State Legal History Colloquium, and at Cumberland Law School. I thank the participants at
these institutions for their helpful comments.
1. 1 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON 212 (Robert A. Rutland ed., 1970).

Mason

delivered this observation to the Fairfax County Committee of Safety on January 17, 1775. See
id.
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helpless in a similar situation. Thus, when he introduced the Virginia
Plan at the Philadelphia Convention, Governor Edmund Randolph
"commented on the difficulty of the crisis" facing the nation and
spoke of "the necessity of preventing the fulfillment of the prophecies
of the American downfall."'2
Randolph "then proceeded to
enumerate the defects" in the present government, noting that "the
confederation produced no security agai[nst] foreign invasion;
congress not being permitted to prevent a war nor to support it by
th[eir] own authority" and that "neither militia nor draughts being fit
for defence on such occasions, enlistments only could be successful,
and these could not be executed without money."'3 He pointed out
that "the federal government could not check the quarrels between
states, nor a rebellion. '4 He expressed his admiration for those who
had written the Articles of Confederation, but noted that they had
produced that document
when the inefficiency of requisitions was unknown-no commercial
discord had arisen among any states-no rebellion had appeared as
in Massts.-foreign debts had not become urgent-the havoc of
paper money had not been foreseen-treaties had not been
violated-and perhaps nothing better could be obtained from the
jealousy of the states with regard to their sovereignty.5
Most of the Convention delegates agreed with Randolph's
analysis and quickly moved from revising the Articles of
Confederation to writing a wholly new Constitution. In the end, they
produced a document that strengthened the national government and
provided a framework for a viable national defense. Opponents of
the new form of government-Antifederalists who feared a strong
national government-proposed numerous amendments in the state
conventions called to ratify the Constitution. The Antifederalists also
expressed their fears of the new Constitution in an enormous amount
6
of public commentary.
Though the public commentary fell into two general classes, the

2. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 18 (Max Farrand ed., rev.
ed. 1966).
3. Id. at 19.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 18-19.
6. The best collection of Antifederalist writings is the seven volume THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). For a critique of that collection, which
discusses its limitations, see Paul Finkelman, Antifederalists: The Loyal Opposition and the
American Constitution, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 182 (1984) (book review). For a discussion of
Antifederalist theory, see SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND
THE DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788-1828 (1999).
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bulk of the proposed amendments were designed to remake the
Constitution by severely limiting the power of the national
government. If the Antifederalists had succeeded, the United States
would have reverted to a decentralized collection of sovereign states
with a weak national congress, an almost invisible federal judiciary,
and a powerless military with virtually no standing army.
Not surprisingly, the Federalists who dominated the First
Congress rejected all of these structural changes and did little to alter
the power of the national government under the new Constitution.
The Federalists did, however, offer a series of amendments that, for
the most part, recognized existing limitations on the national
government under the new Constitution.
The Bill of Rights confirmed that the national government would
not trample on the rights of conscience, deny people due process of
law, or impose cruel and unusual punishments on convicted criminals.
While some of its provisions actually created new rights-such as the
right to counsel in the Sixth Amendment-most of the amendments
simply confirmed what the national government could not do under
the Constitution. The Second and Tenth Amendments reconfirmed
existing relations between the states and the national government but
did not create any new rights or structural relationships.
In
particular, the Second Amendment reconfirmed that even though the
national Congress would have the primary responsibility for arming
and organizing the state militias, the states could maintain their own
militias, if Congress failed to do its job.
I.

THE ANTIFEDERALISTS' GOALS

During the debates over ratification, Governor Patrick Henry of
Virginia and many other Antifederalists used the absence of a bill of
rights in the Constitution to galvanize opposition to ratification. They
persisted, from beginning to end, in claiming that the Constitution
would create a tyranny and that the failure to insert a bill of rights
was an indication of the desire of the framers to take away the
liberties of the American people.
However, for the most dedicated opponents of the Constitution,
the demand for a bill of rights was fundamentally a ruse. They truly
hoped to defeat the Constitution and thus either leave the Articles of
Confederation in place or force a second convention that would have
created a substantially weaker national government than the
Philadelphia Convention had proposed.
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The Antifederalist plan for stopping ratification of course ended
in July 1788, when they were outmaneuvered in their two most
important strongholds-Virginia and New York. New Hampshire's
ratification had supplied the necessary ninth state to have the

Constitution go into effect. Ratification in Virginia and New York
not only put the Federalists well over the top but, more importantly,
brought the most populous state (Virginia) and the state with the

nation's most important seaport (New York) into the government.
As they met with defeat in one state after another, the
Antifederalists fell back to their secondary position of demanding
amendments to alter the nature of the government. 7 Thus, in a

number of the states, the defeated

Antifederalists

proposed

amendments that they hoped would be added after ratification.

Though this was not an ideal strategy for the Antifederalists, it was
their last hope. Some of these amendments contained suggestions
that would have created a bill of rights, but most of the Antifederalist
proposals were crippling amendments that would have resulted in a

weaker Constitution.
The Antifederalists wanted the state ratifying conventions to

endorse their proposed amendments. But this support was not always
possible since the Antifederalists negotiated from a position of
weakness compared to the Federalist majorities in the state

conventions. 8 In Pennsylvania, for example, the Federalist majority
completely ignored the Antifederalists, who then issued their Reasons
of Dissent as a pamphlet.9 In Maryland, the Antifederalists met with
the same fate and resorted to a newspaper publication of their

proposed amendments. 0 As Herbert Storing notes, the Maryland
7. They continued to call for a second convention, which could be accomplished only if
the Antifederalists gained control of nine state legislatures and asked for an Article V
convention. "The Congress... on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the
several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments ....
U.S. CONST. art. V.
This event was unlikely in July 1788 and grew increasingly less likely as the Federalists
organized the new government.
8. One exception to this was New York. That state's convention was totally dominated by
Antifederalists, but part way through the convention the delegates received news that both New
Hampshire and Virginia had ratified the Constitution. This development persuaded some
Antifederalists, including their leader, Melancton Smith, to vote for ratification, because they
believed they were better off inside the Union than out.
9. The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the State of
Pennsylvania to Their Constituents, PA. PACKET & DAILY ADVERTISER, Dec. 18, 1787,
reprinted in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
618, 618 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976).
10. See Address of a Minority of the Maryland Ratifying Convention, MD. GAZETTE, May
6, 1788, reprinted in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 92, 92-100 (Herbert J. Storing ed.,
1981).

2000]

THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

199

Antifederalists tried to get the convention to endorse their
amendments in return for a promise that the Antifederalists would
But, having successfully ratified the
support the Constitution.
Constitution, the Maryland Federalists "brushed aside" the deal
offered by the Antifederalists who had just been soundly defeated.1
On the other hand, in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and
Virginia, the Federalist majorities included the proposed amendments
as part of the official proceedings of the ratifying conventions to
This compromise also
placate large Antifederalist minorities.
occurred in New York. Though the Antifederalists were the majority
in that state, a substantial minority of them voted to ratify the
Constitution because ten states had already done so. In addition,
growing support for the Constitution in and around New York City
convinced many Antifederalist delegates at the New York convention
that their constituents now wanted ratification. 12 John Jay, a
Federalist leader, helped bring this about by a preemptive strike: he
proposed that the convention delegates attach a list of recommended
amendments to its ratification. This arrangement "embarrassed the
Antifederalists"' 3 by compelling them to admit the weakness of their
position and, in a sense, forcing them to accept the best deal they
could negotiate with the Federalists. Jay's move led to a compromise
with the more moderate Antifederalists, who agreed to vote for
ratification in exchange for Federalist endorsement of recommended
amendments. To sweeten the deal, Jay also offered to support a
circular letter calling for a second convention; this was a "sham
compromise that was in fact a total surrender" by the
Antifederalists. 14 In the end, enough Antifederalists voted for
ratification to get the document through the New York convention.
Appended to the ratification was an absurdly long list of proposed
changes that included some thirty-two amendments plus twenty-five
statements of principles.,5
By the end of the ratification process, the conventions in
11. Id.at 92 (headnote by Storing).
12.

See ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE ORDEAL OF THE CONSTITUTION 255-65 (1966).

Even delegates from upstate were "reluctant" to vote against the wishes of New York City. See
LINDA GRANT DE PAUW, THE ELEVENTH PILLAR: NEW YORK STATE AND THE FEDERAL

CONSTITUTION 229 (1966).
RUTLAND, supra note 12, at 259.
14. Id. at 263.
15. New York's proposed amendments are printed in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
13.

THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 21-28 (Helen E. Veit et
al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS].
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Massachusetts, 16 South Carolina, 17 New Hampshire, 8 Virginia, 9 and
New York 0 had appended to their ratification documents various
proposed amendments to the Constitution.
In addition, the
2
2
2
Antifederalists in Pennsylvania ' and Maryland had published their
own recommended amendments. The officially endorsed amend-

ments numbered over one hundred, but many of the separate
amendments actually covered many topics. Thus, the total number of
proposed amendments was at least two hundred. Many concerned

issues we normally think of as Bill of Rights protections. However,
the majority of the Antifederalist demands were structural in nature,
designed to remake the Constitution by weakening the national
government. By eliminating duplications, "[albout 100 separate
proposals can be distinguished," and a "clear majority" of these called
23

for structural changes.
When Madison proposed what became the Bill of Rights in
Congress, he ignored virtually all of the structural proposals, which,

not surprisingly, infuriated the hard-core Antifederalists. Indeed, the
refusal of Madison and his committee to even consider the long list of
structural changes proposed by the Virginia Ratifying Convention led
Virginia's two senators, William Grayson and Richard Henry Lee,
who were the only Antifederalists in the U.S. Senate, to publicly
denounce the proposed amendments. 24 They did not approve of
Madison's proposed amendments because they believed the
amendments would undermine their cause, prevent the calling of a
second convention, and yet leave the structure of the Constitution
16. See id. at 14-15.
17. See id. at 15-16.
18. See id. at 16-17.
19. See id. at 17-22.
20. See id. at 21-28.
21. See The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the State
of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents, supra note 9, at 623; see also 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 627-73,729-38 (1971).
22. See Address of a Minority of the Maryland Ratifying Convention, supra note 10, at 92100.
23. Kenneth R. Bowling, "A Tub to the Whale": The Founding Fathersand Adoption of the
Federal Bill of Rights, 8 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 223, 228 (1988); see also Richard E. Ellis, The
Persistence of Antifederalism After 1789, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 295, 297 (Richard Beeman et al. eds.,
1987) ("The amendments proposed by the states fall into two categories. The first limited the
authority of the central government over individuals.... The amendments of the second group
were both substantive and structural.").
24. See Letter from Richard Henry Lee and William Grayson to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives of Virginia (Sept. 28, 1789), in 2 THE LETTERS OF RICHARD HENRY LEE
507, 507-08 (James Curtis Ballagh ed., 1914).
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intact.
As Madison explained to Jefferson, even before the
Constitution was ratified, the Antifederalists wanted to "strike at the
essence of the System," and either return to the government of the
old Confederation, "or to a partition of the Union into several
Confederacies.

25

A good example of what the Antifederalists really wanted can be
found in the Virginia convention's list of forty proposed amendments.
The first twenty proposals formed "a Declaration or Bill of Rights
asserting and securing from encroachment the essential and
unalienable Rights of the People. '26 Only a few proposals were
structural in nature, such as a requirement for rotation in office and a
prohibition on hereditary offices. 27 Most proposals dealt with the civil
liberties that are today protected by the Bill of Rights subsequently
adopted in 1791.28
After this list of twenty amendments, which would form a "Bill
or Declaration of Rights," the Virginia delegates wrote twenty more
proposed changes called "Amendments to the Body of the
Constitution." 29 With the exception of one proposal dealing with
juries, this list contained proposals that would have remade the
powers of the government and revamped the political process. Many
of the proposals would have hamstrung the operations of the national
government, weakened all three branches of the government, and
rendered the system more cumbersome.
This second list, which was by far the more important list for
Antifederalists like Patrick Henry, proposed a wholesale remaking of
the system of government. The Virginia Antifederalists wanted
super-majorities in Congress for many important government
functions, including: (1) a three-fourths majority of both houses for all
noncommercial treaties, (2) a two-thirds majority of the Senate for
the adoption of all commercial treaties, (3) a two-thirds majority in
each house of Congress for all regulations of commerce (which the
Antifederalists called navigation laws), and (4) a two-thirds majority
in Congress to maintain a peacetime army. 30 They also clamored for
mandatory term limits (rotation in office, as they called it) for
25. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 9, 1787), in 10 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 310, 312 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1977).
26.

CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 15, at 17-19.

27.
28.
29.
30.

See id.
See id.
Id. at 19.
See id. at 19-21.
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presidents and severely limited federal jurisdiction over what became
the District of Columbia.' Aside from the Supreme Court, these
'32
Antifederalists would have allowed only "courts of Admiralty.
They would have permitted impeachment trials of senators by "some
Tribunal other than the Senate" and limited the power of the national
33
government to collect taxes in the states.
Antifederalists in other states wanted similar changes that would
have cut the heart out of the new Constitution. Virtually all the
Antifederalists would have rewritten the judiciary article to the point
where the federal court system would have been unrecognizable and
our resulting constitutional history would have been altered in
unimaginable ways. 34
Delegates to the New York Ratifying
Convention, with its large Antifederalist majority, proposed
structural changes similar to those the Virginia Antifederalists
demanded. A Constitution amended to satisfy these New Yorkers
would have limited federal diversity jurisdiction only to cases
involving land grants, prohibited any federal treaty from operating
against a state constitution (thus undermining the Supremacy
Clause), and proscribed Congress from granting monopolies.3 5 In
addition, the New Yorkers would have limited power with the
following requirements: (1) a two-thirds majority in both houses of
Congress to borrow money or to declare war, (2) strict temporal
limitations on the suspension of habeas corpus, (3) mandatory
rotation in office for U.S. senators, and (4) prohibitions on federal
capitation taxes and on the creation of intermediate appellate federal
courts.3 6 The New Yorkers also suggested limitations on the
president's pardon power and on the federal power to adopt
bankruptcy laws.37
Antifederalists in Massachusetts and New
Hampshire similarly sought to limit federal court jurisdiction, prohibit
the federal government from granting monopolies, and restrict the
38
federal government's power to tax.
The fact that the majority of Antifederalist proposals were
structural, rather than libertarian, underscores the fact that the most
31. See id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See Wythe Holt, "To Establish Justice": Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the
Invention of the FederalCourts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1477, 1493.
35. See CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 15, at 21-28.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 14-17.
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prominent Antifederalists were only marginally interested in a bill of
rights. Indeed, among the hard-core Antifederalists it is clear that the
argument about a bill of rights was, for the most part, a stalking horse
for their larger goal-to undermine the strength of the new central
government. Antifederalist leaders like Henry and Lee really wanted
to defeat the Constitution and either go back to the old system or
force a second convention where they could rewrite the document
along the states' rights lines that interested them. But, having failed
to defeat the Constitution, they strove for crippling amendments that
went to the very structure of that document. James Madison believed
that the Antifederalist leaders were really involved in a "conspiracy
agst. direct taxes" which was "the real object of all their zeal in
opposing the system. '39 Madison believed their ultimate goal was to
destroy the power of the national government to levy any taxes and
thus "re-establish the supremacy of the State Legislatures." 4° Thus,
they vociferously demanded a bill of rights before the Constitution
was ratified in hopes that the purported lack of libertarian protections
would persuade more moderate Americans to help them defeat
ratification. But, once the Constitution was ratified, they were no
longer interested in a bill of rights and instead wanted a wholesale
restructuring of the Constitution.
This quick overview of the major Antifederalist demands
illustrates how out-of-step they were with the Federalist majorities in
the ratifying conventions and how decisively they were defeated in
1787-88, when the Constitution was ratified. Similarly, they were
even more out-of-step with the massive Federalist Congressional
majority in 1789, which proposed the Bill of Rights. In 1789-91, the
hard-core Antifederalists suffered their final defeat, as Federalists
and moderate Antifederalists accepted the Bill of Rights, and with it,
the victory of the Constitution itself.
The Second Amendment arose out of the conflict between
Federalists and Antifederalists over those portions of the Constitution that dealt with the militia and the national army. But it was
ultimately tied to the larger Federalist-Antifederalist conflict over the
nature of the new government itself.

39. Letter from James Madison to Tench Coxe (July 30, 1788), in 11 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON, supra note 25, at 210, 210; see also RUTLAND, supra note 12, at 301.
40. Letter from James Madison to Tench Coxe, supra note 39, at 210.
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II. THE CONSTITUTION, THE MILITIA, AND THE NATIONAL ARMY
The framers in Philadelphia gave Congress and the president
shared responsibility for the ultimate control of the militia. They also
gave state governments important responsibilities and powers in
organizing and training militias, while at the same time taking
ultimate authority from the states.
Article I of the Constitution gives Congress power to "declare
War, '41 "to raise and support Armies, ' 42 to "maintain a Navy,' 43 to
make "Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces," 44 to "provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the
Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions," ' 41 and
46
"to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia."
Furthermore, Article I declares that the states may not "keep Troops,
or Ships of War in time of Peace. ' 47 Article II makes the president of
the United States the "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy"
and "of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual
Service of the United States."8 These provisions also contain two
important limitations. Congress can only appropriate money for the
military for two years, 49 and the states retain the power to appoint all
militia officers and to train the militia, provided this training complies
with "the discipline prescribed by Congress."50
Taken together, these provisions contemplated two levels of
military protection for the new nation: (1) a national army created
and governed solely by Congress and ultimately under the authority
of the president in his capacity as commander in chief, and (2) a
system of state militias, essentially organized and under control of the
states, but subject to regulation by Congress and to "federalization"
at the command of the president. Part of that regulation included the
idea that the national government had the power-and the
obligation-to provide arms for the local militias. 1 As Rufus King
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.11.
Id. cl.12.
Id. cl.
13.
Id. cl.
14.
Id. cl.
15.
Id. cl.
16.

47. Id. § 10, cl.
3.
48. Id. art. II, § 2, cl.
1.
49. See id. art. I, § 8, cl.
12.
50. Id. cl.16.
51. "The Congress shall have Power... [t]o provide for organizing, arming, and
disciplining, the Militia." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
1, 16.
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explained at the Convention, "arming meant not only to provide for
uniformity of arms, but included authority to regulate the modes of
furnishing, either by the militia themselves, the State Governments,
or the National Treasury. ' 52 Thus, the defense of the United States
would rely on both the state militias and the standing army.
For a variety of reasons, most Antifederalists feared these
arrangements. They were most concerned about the federal standing
army. According to the traditional Whig and Republican ideology of
the period, a standing army threatened the liberties of a free people.53
This argument was rooted in English history, where the army was
traditionally a remote mercenary force, disconnected from the
people, and under the direct control of a hereditary monarch. The
experience of the Revolution also led to hostility for the standing
army. For example, in 1770, after Lord Hillsborough sent British
troops to American soil, Benjamin Franklin reportedly felt that the
British army had been sent to silence the protests of the colonial
54
settlers, rather than cure the problems of which they complained.
The Declaration of Independence, which Franklin later helped write,
polemically, but accurately, included the standing army in its laundry
list of complaints against the king:
He has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without
the Consent of our Legislature.
He has affected to render the Military independent of and
superior to the Civil Power.
He

has... giv[en] ...his

Assent

to... acts of

pretended

Legislation:
For quartering large bodies of armed troops among us.55
Madison and other Federalists believed that the Constitution
directly responded to these issues in several ways.
In the
Constitution, the military was triply under civilian control: Congress
regulated all branches of the military, the president was the ultimate
commander in chief of all the military, and the governors controlled
the state militias when not under federal authority. Meanwhile,
appropriations for the military were limited to two years, thus
preventing a true standing army from taking control. The only
52. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 385.
53. See generally JOHN PHILLIP REID, IN DEFIANCE OF THE LAW: THE STANDING-ARMY
CONTROVERSY, THE TWO CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE COMING OF
REVOLUTION (1981).
54. See REID, supra note 53, at 15.
55. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 13-16 (U.S. 1776).
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"military" provision of the Declaration not directly addressed by the

Constitution was the fear of the "quartering of large Bodies of Troops
among us."

process.

Wisely, the framers left that problem to the political

Given the close proximity to the British in Canada, the

Spanish in the west, and Native Americans everywhere, it would have
been foolish indeed to prohibit the placement of troops close to
population centers. 56 Ironically, of course, modern civic leaders

across the nation avidly compete for the location of forts and bases in
their communities. The complaint of many communities like Fort
Dix, New Jersey, is that Congress, the president, or some faceless
base-closing commission has refused to continue to quarter "large

Bodies of Troops among us."
The Antifederalists proposed amendments that would have
altered these provisions of the Constitution. Had the Antifederalists
succeeded, the United States would have become a fundamentally
different, and weaker, nation. However, Madison and his colleagues

in Congress soundly rejected the Antifederalist proposals.
III. ANTIFEDERALIST HOPES: THE CASE OF THE PENNSYLVANIA
MINORITY

At the end of the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, the
Antifederalists were soundly defeated. After that state convention,
they published their Reasons of Dissent.7 Part of this document
contained a list of fourteen proposed amendments to the
Constitution. Some of these proposals-those dealing with the
protection of individual libertarian rights and legal due process-were
later incorporated, almost word-for-word, into the Bill of Rights. The
essence, and in some places the exact language, of the Free Exercise

56. The concept of quartering troops actually evokes two different historical issues. One
was the presence of a large standing army in colonial cities. For example, relative to the size of
Boston, the British placed huge numbers of troops in that city. Neither the Constitution nor the
Bill of Rights prevents Congress from quartering large numbers of troops among us. The
second aspect of quartering troops stemmed from the British policy of forcing colonists to
provide lodging for soldiers. No one at the Convention contemplated the national government
ever doing this, except in an emergency. But, Antifederalists, remembering the British practice
and fearful of the new national government, complained that this might occur. Thus the First
Congress, in what became the Third Amendment, banned the practice, except in time of war.
57. The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the State of
Pennsylvania to Their Constituents, supra note 9, at 618. Near the end of the Pennsylvania
Ratifying Convention, delegate Robert Whitehill offered most of these provisions as a series of
amendments to the Constitution, but the convention rejected them.
See 15 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 8-11 (John P.
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1984).
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Clause 58 and the Free Press and Speech Clauses 9 of the First
Amendment are found in these fourteen proposals, as are the essence
64
63
and language of the Fourth,60 Fifth,61 Sixth, 62 Seventh, and Eighth
Amendments. Elements of the Tenth Amendment are also found in

the proposals. 65

Congress ignored a number of other proposed

amendments on taxation, the size of the House of Representatives,
the power of the federal courts, and treaty-making power.
The Pennsylvania Antifederalists also proposed amendments

concerning the army, the militia, the right to bear arms, and the right
to hunt. These amendments addressed at least six separate issues: (1)
the right of self-protection through the ownership of weapons, (2) the
right to serve in the militia, (3) the right to hunt and fish, (4) the
prevention of a standing army, (5) the power of Congress over the
states, and (6) the power of the states to control their own armies or
militias. 66 The proposals, which are found in three of the fourteen
58. Number One of the Reasons of Dissent declared that "[tihe right of conscience shall be
held inviolable." The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the
State of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents, supra note 9, at 623.
59. Number Six of the Reasons of Dissent declared "[t]hat the people have a right to the
freedom of speech, of writing and publishing their sentiments, therefore, the freedom of the
press shall not be restrained by any law of the United States." Id. Curiously, this is one of the
very few Antifederalist documents to use the term "freedom of speech." The fact that Madison
included "speech" in the First Amendment may indicate his use of the Reasons of Dissent.
60. Number Five of the Reasons of Dissent declared
[t]hat warrants unsupported by evidence, whereby any officer or messenger may be
commanded or required to search suspected places or to seize any person or persons,
his or their property, not particularly described, are grievous and oppressive, and shall
not be granted either by the magistrates of the federal government or others.
Id.
61. Number Three of the Reasons of Dissent declared "[t]hat no man be deprived of his
liberty, except by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers." Id.
62. Number Three of the Reasons of Dissent declared
[tihat in all capital and criminal prosecutions, a man has a right to demand the cause
and nature of his accusation.., to be heard by himself and his counsel; to be
confronted with the accusers and witnesses; to call for evidence in his favor, and a
speedy trial by an impartial jury of his vicinage.
Id.
63. Number Two of the Reasons of Dissent declared "[tihat in controversies respecting
property, and in suits between man and man, trial by jury shall remain as heretofore, as well in
the federal courts, as in those of the several states." Id.
64. Number Four of the Reasons of Dissent declared "[t]hat excessive bail ought not to be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel nor unusual punishments inflicted." Id. Except
for changing two words, this is the exact wording of what became the Eighth Amendment. See
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
65. The second paragraph of Number Eleven asserted "[t]hat the sovereignty, freedom,
and independency of the several states shall be retained, and every power, jurisdiction, and right
which is not by this constitution expressly delegated to the United States in Congress
assembled." The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the State
of Pennsylvaniato Their Constituents,supra note 9, at 624.
66. See id. at 623-24.
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amendments offered by the Pennsylvania minority, help us
understand the intentions of the framers of the Second Amendment.
This understanding, however, is a negative one. By seeing what the
framers of the Second Amendment did not do, we can better
understand what they did do.
Had the proposals of the Pennsylvania Antifederalists on this
issue been written into the Bill of Rights, the Second Amendment
might be the least controversial of the first ten Amendments. It is of
utmost significance, however, that unlike other aspects of the
Pennsylvania proposals, which were incorporated into the Bill of
Rights almost word-for-word, Madison and his colleagues in the First
Congress emphatically rejected the goals and the language of the
Pennsylvania Antifederalists on these issues.
Thus, it is useful to consider what Congress might have written,
but did not. Number Seven of the amendments listed in the Reasons
of Dissent provided
[tihat the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of
themselves and their own state, or the United States, or for the
purpose of killing game; and no law shall be passed for disarming
the people or any of them, unless for crimes committed, or real
danger of public injury from individuals; and as standing armies in
the time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be
kept up; and that the military shall be kept 67 under strict
subordination to and be governed by the civil powers.
Number Eight, an entirely separate provision, asserted that:
The inhabitants of the several states shall have liberty to fowl and
hunt in seasonable times, on the lands they hold, and on all other
lands in the United States not enclosed, and in like manner to fish
in all navigable waters, and others not private property, without
being restrained therein
by any laws to be passed by the legislature
68
of the United States.
Number Eleven from the dissenters' list was the only one that
contained two separate paragraphs. At first glance the paragraphs
seem entirely separate and oddly juxtaposed. Careful examination
suggests a connection. The first paragraph declared
[t]hat the power of organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia
(the manner of disciplining the militia to be prescribed by
Congress) remain with the individual states, and that Congress shall
not have authority to call or march any of the militia out of their
own state, without the consent of such state, and for such length of

67. Id.
68. Id. at 624.
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69
time only as such state shall agree.
The second paragraph of Number Eleven asserted "[t]hat the
sovereignty, freedom, and independency of the several states shall be
retained, and every power, jurisdiction, and right which is not by this
constitution expressly delegated to the United States in Congress
assembled."7 0 This second paragraph, when tied to the previous one,
underscores the connection many Antifederalists saw between state
sovereignty and the control of the state militia.
If Congress in 1789 had accepted these proposals of the
Pennsylvania minority, then one might persuasively argue that the
Constitution, as amended, guaranteed a personal and individual right
of Americans to own weapons "for the defense of themselves and
their own state, or the United States, or for the purpose of killing
game."'71 Both the personal self-defense interests and the "American
sportsman" interests of organizations of gun owners would then have
been explicitly protected by the Bill of Rights. We might argue today
about what sort of weapons are protected. It is not clear that such
provisions would today protect the private ownership of Saturday
night specials, assault rifles (however Congress might define them),
submachine guns, sawed-off shotguns, bazookas, or flamethrowers.
But, whatever fell in or out of the protected arena, the constitutional
principle of private ownership of weapons would have been clear.
Had Congress added these provisions to the Bill of Rights, we
would also have a very different country than we have today,
assuming, of course, that we still would have a country. It is entirely
possible that the provisions limiting both a standing army and the
power of the national government to call up the militia would have
long ago led to a destruction of the nation from either outside forces
or internal disruptions.
If we contemplate the implications of the Pennsylvania
proposals-especially in light of subsequent developments in
American history-we immediately see why Congress completely
rejected the Pennsylvanians' demands for state control of the militia
and for personal ownership of guns.
Such provisions might have prevented the Washington
administration from effectively suppressing the Whiskey Rebellion or
the Madison administration from calling out troops to face down the

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 623-24.
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British in 1812. Without the ability to call up the militia, President
Andrew Jackson might not have successfully stood up to the
nullificationists in South Carolina. 72 In responding to the Nullification
Proclamation in 1832, President Jackson reminded the citizens of
South Carolina that "[d]isunion by armed force is treason,"73 and
made it clear that this behavior would be met by military force equal
to the task of crushing the rebellion. This stance would not have been
possible if the states had retained full control of the militias or if the
national government had been precluded from disarming rebellious
citizens. Similarly, if the Pennsylvania Antifederalists had succeeded,
it is unlikely that the Pierce administration could have used the
Massachusetts militia to help return the fugitive slave Anthony Burns
74
from Boston in 1854.
Then, of course, there is the war of 1861-65-variously called the
Civil War, the War Between the States, the War for Southern
Independence-but rarely any more called by its only official name,
the War of the Rebellion.75 Had the restrictive provisions of the
Pennsylvania minority been enacted, President Lincoln might have
been unable to call out the state militias to suppress the rebellion.
Madison and his colleagues could not have predicted the
Whiskey Rebellion, the Nullification crisis, or the Civil War. But they
were shrewd enough to know that the lack of national military
power-and with it the power to disarm those who are in rebellion or
might be in rebellion-would undermine any national state. Having
just created a stronger national state in the wake of Shays's Rebellion
and similar rebellions in other states,7 6 the Federalists in Congress,
72. In his message to the people of South Carolina during the nullification crisis, President
Jackson noted that:
The war into which we were forced to support the dignity of the nation and the rights
of our citizens might have ended in defeat and disgrace, instead of victory and honor, if
the States who supposed it a ruinous and unconstitutional measure had thought they
possessed the right of nullifying the act by which it was declared and denying supplies
for its prosecution.
Proclamation by Andrew Jackson, President of the United States (Dec. 10, 1832), in 3 A
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1203, 1205 (James D.

Richardson ed., 1897). Had the militias been immune from federal control, the states would
have been able to prevent the prosecution of the war without actually having to nullify the
declaration of war.
73. Id. at 1217.
74. See generally Paul Finkelman, Legal Ethics and Fugitive Slaves: The Anthony Burns
Case, Judge Loring, and Abolitionist Attorneys, 17 CARDOzO L. REV. 1793 (1996).
75. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF WAR, THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE
OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES (1880-1901).
76. See Don Higginbotham, The Federalized Militia Debate: A Neglected Aspect of Second
Amendment Scholarship, 55 WM. & MARY Q. 39, 43-44 (1998).
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many of whom had been in the Philadelphia Convention, the state
ratifying conventions, or both, took no steps to undermine the ability
of the national government to protect itself from enemies without or
rebels and traitors within.
If the Second Amendment had responded to the demands of the
Pennsylvania
minority
and similar demands
from other
Antifederalists, the national government would have been severely,
perhaps fatally, weakened from the beginning. Congress would have
been unable to regulate the use, ownership, or display of firearms in
those places where it has plenary jurisdiction, such as the District of
Columbia, the federal territories, or overseas possessions and lands,
such as present day Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.
At the time of the drafting of the Constitution, "every state had
gun control legislation on its books."77 But, an amendment along the
lines of the Pennsylvania Antifederalists' would have prevented such
a law in the federal district.7 8 It also might have prevented
preemptive strikes against pirates, illegal slave traders (after 1808),
filibusters preparing for the illegal invasion of Latin American
countries,7 9 or others gathering weapons for illegal purposes.
As previously discussed, one of the primary reasons for calling
the Constitutional Convention was the fear that without a stronger
central government the new nation would be unstable, militarily
weak, and might not survive. In 1786, disgruntled farmers in western
Massachusetts, led by Captain Daniel Shays, had shut down courts
and threatened a full-scale civil war in the Bay State. Some militia
units had joined the rebels before militiamen from eastern
Massachusetts finally dispersed Shays's followers. 80 Shays's Rebellion
had deeply frightened the elected political leaders who governed the
nation after the Revolution. As Edmund Randolph noted when he
introduced the Virginia Plan at the Philadelphia Convention, the
"rebellion [that] had appeared ... in Massts' ' 81 underscored the need
77. Michael A. Bellesiles, Gun Laws In Early America: The Regulation of Firearms
Ownership, 1607-1794, 16 LAW & HIST. REV. 567, 587 (1998). See generally MICHAEL A.
BELLESILES, ARMING AMERICA: THE ORIGINS OF A NATIONAL GUN CULTURE (2000).

78. So, too, would an individualist reading of the Second Amendment.
79. In the nineteenth century, Americans organized military expeditions against Cuba and
Nicaragua. See, e.g., ALBERT Z. CARR, THE WORLD AND WILLIAM WALKER (1963). These
preparations began with the accumulation of weapons for the invasion. See, e.g., id. Such an
invasion then, or now, might easily drag the nation into a foreign war. Yet, presumably under
the Pennsylvania minority's proposal, the government could not stop the accumulation or
export of weapons.
80. See, e.g., Higginbotham, supra note 76, at 43-44.
81.

1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 18-19.
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for a stronger government.
The Federalists at the Philadelphia Convention wanted a
government that would have the prestige, organizational apparatus,
tax revenue, and military power to suppress such rebellions in the
future. Indeed, Shays's Rebellion helped convince many of the need
for a new constitution with a strong national military.
The kind of amendments that the Pennsylvania minority wanted
would have undermined these powers and the new government itself.
Such amendments would have crippled the national government's
82
ability to suppress insurrections, regulate trade with the Indians,
fight piracy, or even prevent crime in the federal district (now
Washington, D.C.), in the federal territories, and wherever else
federal jurisdiction existed. Thus, in drafting the Bill of Rights, James
Madison and his Congressional colleagues emphatically rejected the
sweeping provisions of the Pennsylvania minority and other
Antifederalists relating to the military, the militia, and firearms 83 and
instead adopted a much more limited amendment, directed at only
one particular issue: the preservation of the organized state militias as
a military force. The Congressmen of 1789 were not interested in
protecting the rights to "killing game," "to fowl and hunt in
seasonable times," "to fish in all navigable waters," or even to
guarantee that people should be able to "bear arms for the defense of
themselves." 84 Congress was certainly on notice that demands for
explicit protections of such rights were on the table and could easily
have put such language into the Bill of Rights. Madison, along with
the rest of Congress, was well aware of the Reasons of Dissent, which
was printed in numerous Pennsylvania papers, including the
important Pennsylvania Packet, and was also published as a
broadside. 8 The fact that Madison and Congress did not propose
amendments along the lines demanded by the Pennsylvania minority
leads to a prima facie conclusion that they did not intend to
incorporate such protections into the Bill of Rights.

82. It is worth noting that colonies regulated the sale of guns to Indians; it would seem odd
that the framers of the Second Amendment might jeopardize such regulation with a sweeping
personal right to own weapons. See Bellesiles, supra note 77, at 584.
83. As well as on other structural changes and limitations of the national government.
84. The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the State of
Pennsylvania to Their Constituents,supra note 9, at 623-24.
85. See 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 10, at 145. Because the
Pennsylvania Antifederalists had been unable to get their state convention to endorse their
proposed amendments, they were not officially before Congress.
Nevertheless, similar
amendments, some even more extreme, were before Congress.
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THE BILL OF RIGHTS: PRESERVING THE CONSTITUTION

Why is it that Madison and his colleagues rejected the demands
of the Pennsylvania Antifederalists on the issues of guns, the militia,
and the national military? The Second Amendment, like the others
in the Bill of Rights, was designed to preserve the Constitution as
written in 1787 by adding to the Constitution a bill of rights that did
not fundamentally alter the nature of the national government or
significantly limit its powers.
In examining what became the Second Amendment, it is also
critical to remember that Madison, who proposed the amendments,
had, in fact, little enthusiasm for them. His paternity as the father of
the Bill of Rights was truly reluctant. 86 When Madison introduced the
amendments to the House of Representatives, he did not argue with
passion or conviction for his proposal. He told Congress that he had
"never considered" a bill of rights "so essential to the federal
constitution" that the lack of one should have been allowed to
impede ratification. 87 But, with the Constitution ratified, Madison
was willing to concede "that in a certain form, and to a certain
extent," a bill of rights "was neither improper nor altogether
useless."'
While proposing amendments that were neither
"improper" nor "useless," Madison was careful, as he noted in a
private letter to Edmund Randolph, to make sure that "the structure
& stamina of the Govt. [were] as little touched as possible." 89 It is this
goal of Madison-to protect the "structure & stamina" of the new
government-that most illuminates the very limited nature of what
became the Second Amendment.
In general, Madison saw the Bill of Rights as clarifying the
meaning of the Constitution and not fundamentally changing its
nature. 90 He had no problem expressly protecting freedom of
religion, for example, because he did not think that the purpose of the
Constitution was to allow Congress to regulate religion, even where
Congress had plenary jurisdiction. 91 Similarly, he had no desire to
deny the right of a jury trial in federal prosecutions and so had no
86. See Paul Finkelman, James Madison and the Bill of Rights: A Reluctant Paternity, 1990
Sup. Cr. REV. 301 (1991).
87. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 453 (Joseph Gales & William Seaton eds., 1789).
88. Id.
89. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (June 15, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON 219, 219 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1979).
90. See generally Finkelman, supra note 86.
91. See id. at 326.

CHICAGO-KENT LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 76:195

problem explicitly protecting that right in the Sixth Amendment. 92 In
the same way, Madison did not think that the purpose of the
Constitution was to allow the national government to dismantle or
disarm the state militias. Since some people feared the Federalists
might do this, 93 Madison was willing to put a provision in the Bill of
Rights explicitly stating that Congress would not disarm the state
militias. At the same time, he had no interest in preventing Congress
from regulating weapons in the places where Congress had clear
legislative power. Thus, Madison did not accept the sweeping
proposed amendments of the Pennsylvania Antifederalists on this
issue. Madison had worked for a strong government, with a national
army and the power to federalize state militias, at the Philadelphia
Convention. He had no interest in undermining this strength in the
Bill of Rights either by prohibiting a standing army, removing the
power of the national government to control the state militias, or by
permitting individual citizens or groups of them to have unfettered
access to weapons. 94
Indeed, given what was accomplished in 1787, it would have
been out of character for Congress, dominated as it was by supporters
of the new Constitution, to cripple the new government's ability to
control dangerous, musket-toting elements of the population like
Daniel Shays. Similarly, it would have been out of character to take
the citizens' army-the militia-and turn it over to the complete
control of state governors, who might not be sympathetic to the
policies of the national regime. Not surprisingly, in the Bill of Rights,
including what became the Second Amendment, Congress did not
take such drastic actions.
V. THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A GREAT FEDERALIST VICTORY
It is commonplace among some scholars to view the struggle for
the Bill of Rights as a victory for the Antifederalists, the original
opponents of the Constitution. At first glance, this argument makes a
certain sense. Many Antifederalists argued that they feared a strong
central government because the Constitution lacked a bill of rights. If
the Constitution had a bill of rights, these Antifederalists claimed,
they could then support the system of government created in
92. See id. at 326-28.
93. See infra p. 223 and notes 141-46.
94. See Finkelman, supra note 86, at 337. For more detailed information on Madison's life
and views, see generally RALPH LOUIS KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY (1971).
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Philadelphia. Because the Antifederalists asked for a bill of rights,
some scholars incorrectly see the adoption of the Bill of Rights as a
successful counterattack by the Antifederalists.
This argument is, at best, only half true. Certainly it is unlikely
that the Federalists, who completely dominated the new government,
would have proposed and passed a bill of rights if the Antifederalists
had not called for one. But it is clear that the Bill of Rights adopted
by Congress, and sent on to the states, contained only a tiny portion
of what the Antifederalists wanted. Moreover, these changes were in
many ways the least important in the minds of the Antifederalist
leadership, like Patrick Henry and Richard Henry Lee. Hard-core
Antifederalists considered the Bill of Rights to be a "tub to the
whale," 95 designed to distract the people away from calling a second
convention to substantially rewrite the Constitution.
One insight into the Antifederalist disappointment over the
amendments comes from a cursory glance at the order of the states
that ratified them. Five of the first six states to ratify the Bill of
Rights were Federalist strongholds. 96 Virginia, the state most often
associated with the call for a bill of rights, was actually the last state to
ratify the ten amendments that became the Bill of Rights.
The story of ratification of the Bill of Rights in Virginia
illustrates just how much the Antifederalists' demand for
amendments became a defeat for their cause. Patrick Henry, the
most powerful political figure in this Antifederalist stronghold,
disliked the proposed amendments. Henry had campaigned against
the Constitution because he wanted to defeat it and start all over. He
used the lack of a bill of rights as an argument against the
Constitution; but when offered the Bill of Rights in 1789, he balked.97
Henry fully understood that a bill of rights would destroy the
possibility of achieving his real goal, which was to destroy or
completely undermine and remake the new Constitution. Henry and
his cohorts correctly realized that if the lack of a bill of rights were no
95. The "tub to the whale" was a maritime expression. If a whale appeared to be attacking
a ship, sailors would throw an empty tub into the ocean hoping to distract the whale, so that it
would leave the ship alone. See Bowling, supra note 23, at 223.
96. The sixth ratifying state was New York, which had elected an overwhelmingly
Antifederalist ratifying convention, but which became strongly Federalist after the adoption of
the Constitution. For a history of the ratification of the Constitution in New York, see generally
DE PAUW, supra note 12. The order of ratification is found in DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF

1065 (Charles C. Tansill ed., 1927).
97. See Brent Tarter, Virginians and the Bill of Rights, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A LIVELY
HERITAGE 3, 13-15 (Jon Kukla ed., 1987).
THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF AMERICAN STATES
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longer an issue, many of the softer Antifederalists would be satisfied
with the Constitution and accept the new government. Thus, in the
fall of 1789, Virginia's two U.S. senators, William Grayson and
Richard Henry Lee, urged their state to defeat the Bill of Rights and
to hold out for more sweeping amendments. 98 Following this plan for
more than two years, Patrick Henry prevented the Virginia
legislature, which he dominated, from ratifying the new
amendments. 99 Henry was hoping that in these two years Americans
would come to accept his view that the stronger national government
was dangerous to the liberty of the people. 100 But, in Virginia,
precisely the opposite happened. Two intervening elections sapped
much of Henry's strength in the Virginia Assembly, which finally
ratified the Bill of Rights in December 1791.101
Ultimately the Antifederalists were triple losers. They failed to
prevent ratification of the Constitution, they failed to make
ratification conditional on the adoption of a whole series of
amendments, and in the end, they failed to gain acceptance of what
they considered to be their most important amendments. The
Virginia Antifederalists, for example, proposed forty separate
amendments to the Constitution, including twenty to the "Body of
the Constitution.'1 02 Congress ignored these twenty and a good
number of the other twenty that would have made up a "Declaration
or Bill of Rights." 10 3 New York's proposed amendments take up
seven printed pages, with fifty-nine separate paragraphs and scores of
proposed changes. New Hampshire modestly proposed only twelve
changes, and Massachusetts a paltry eight. But, had Congress
accepted all, or most, of the proposals from the ratifying conventions
of just these four states, along with the demands of the Pennsylvania
minority, it would have effectively rewritten the Constitution,
creating an entirely different kind of government.
Again, we should not be surprised that this result did not happen.
Most Federalists wanted no changes in the Constitution. They
believed a bill of rights was unnecessary because the new national
government, as a government of limited and enumerated powers,
98. See Letter from Richard Henry Lee and William Grayson to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives of Virginia, supra note 24, at 507-08.
99. See Tarter, supra note 97, at 13-15.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 15, at 19.
103. Id. at 17.
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could not threaten fundamental rights and individual liberties.
Nevertheless, Federalists in the First Congress were willing to accept
amendments that enumerated basic civil liberties and procedural
rights or explicitly reaffirmed limitations on the national government
that they believed were already in the Constitution of 1787. These
amendments were neither designed to affect, nor did they affect, the
structure of the Constitution or the new national government formed
under it. In presenting them to Congress, Madison was unequivocally
''unwilling to see a door opened for a re-consideration of the whole
structure of the government, for a re-consideration of the principles
and the substance of the powers given." 1°4 The Bill of Rights was
emphatically neither a Constitution, 105 nor a significant alteration of
the political relationships created by the Constitution. The Bill of
Rights did not shift any political power from the national government
to either the states or "the people." It merely clarified the powers,
rights, and responsibilities that the national government had under
the Constitution.
The hard-core Antifederalists, of course, did not condone
Madison's proposed amendments precisely because they believed
that the amendments would undermine their cause, while leaving the
structure of the Constitution intact. They wanted to "strike at the
essence of the System," and either return to the government of the
old Confederation "or to a partition of the Union into several
Confederacies. '' 106

As the "loyal opposition" in the ratification process, 0 7 the
Antifederalists were responsible for placing the demand for a bill of
rights on the national agenda. Moreover, their demands forced the
Federalists to respond. The accomplishment of the Antifederalists
was to pressure the Federalists to add a bill of rights to the
Constitution. But in a sense, this "accomplishment" was their failure.
The Antifederalists, especially the hard-core opponents of the
Constitution led by Patrick Henry, did not want to modify the
Constitution with a bill of rights so that it would be more palatable to
the people; they wanted to totally undermine the Constitution or
104. Speech of James Madison (June 8, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra
note 15, at 77, 79.
105. See Paul Finkelman, The Ten Amendments As a Declarationof Rights, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J.
351 (1992). Here I reject the clever, but unpersuasive, arguments found in Akhil Reed Amar,
The Bill of Rights As a Constitution,100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991).
106. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 25, at 312.
107. Finkelman, supra note 6.
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replace it with something else. This, they failed to achieve.
VI. FEDERAL POWER TO SUPPRESS VIOLENCE

In addition to creating national military powers, the Constitution
contains a series of clauses that empowered Congress to suppress the
activities of people who threatened the public order. Certainly the
framers anticipated that most law enforcement would be at the local
level, but they also knew that some would be at the national level.
Thus, Congress had the power to punish counterfeiting,108 to
"punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and
Offences against the Law of Nations," 10 9 to "suppress Insurrections
and repel Invasions," by employing the militias,110 and to suppress the
African Slave Trade after January 1, 1808.111 Congress could also
"regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes."" 2 The U.S. government also was
obligated to "protect" each state from "Invasion" and "domestic
11 3
Violence."
As previously noted, some of the impetus for the Constitution
stemmed from the violence of Shays's Rebellion and the general fear
of anarchy. This motivation was clear during the Convention, as
Randolph's first speech suggests. 114 Even before the delegates met in
Philadelphia, those who would emerge as Federalists argued for a
strong and vigorous government to defeat anarchy. In the months
before the Convention, Alexander Hamilton declared, "It might be
said that too little power is as dangerous as too much, that it leads to
anarchy, and from anarchy to despotism. 111 5 And, just as the
Convention began serious work, Henry Knox, who was not a
delegate, wrote that "we are verging fast to anarchy and that the
present convention is the only means to avoid the most flagitious evils
l 6
that ever afflicted three millions of freemen.""1
108. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. cl. 9.
Id. cl. 15.
See id. § 9, cl. 1.
Id. § 8, cl. 3.
Id. art. IV, § 4.
114. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 19.
115. Alexander Hamilton, First Speech on the Address of the Legislature to Governor
George Clinton's Message before the New York Assembly (Jan. 19, 1787), in 4 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 3, 11 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1962).
116. Letter from Henry Knox to John Sullivan (May 21, 1787), in SUPPLEMENT TO MAX
FARRAND'S THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 12, 13 (James H.
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At the Convention, delegates picked up on this theme and tied it
to the military. Charles Pinckney argued that a strong national
government was necessary to create "a real military force."1"7 He
noted that "[t]he United States had been making an experiment
without" a strong military, "and we see the consequence in their rapid
approaches toward anarchy."' 1 8 James Wilson believed the nation
had to worry about "anarchy & tyranny within" but also needed to be
strong to avoid "wars" and to make "treaties."" 9 Wilson argued that
a weak government would be "liable to anarchy & tyranny.

1 20

Hugh

Williamson feared that "the probable consequences of anarchy in the
U.S." would be military force against the states, which in turn would
lead to tyranny.1 21 Thus, the framers wrote a Constitution that made
the state militias subordinate to the national government and
guaranteed that the national government would have the power to
enforce its laws.
After the Convention, Federalists hammered home this theme.
Writing as "Publius," Alexander Hamilton argued that "[a] Firm
Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of the
122
States" and would prevent "domestic faction and insurrection.
The alternative was a society "kept in a state of perpetual vibration
between the

extremes

of tyranny

and anarchy.'12

3

Only the

Constitution could prevent the recurring "tempestuous waves of
sedition and party-rage.'

24

With the Constitution ratified, George

Washington could only hope the new system would work as planned:
The business of this convention is as yet too much in embryo to
form any opinion of the conclusion. Much is expected from it by
some; not much by others; and nothing by a few. That something is
necessary, none will deny; for the situation of the general
government, if it can be called a government, is shaken to its
foundation, and liable to be overturned by every blast. In a word, it
is at an end; and, unless a remedy is soon applied, anarchy and
confusion will inevitably ensue.121
Hutson ed., 1987).
117. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 332.
118. Id.
119. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 426.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 532.
122. THE FEDERALIST No. 9 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in AMERICAN STATE
PAPERS 47, 47 (1980).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Letter from George Washington to Thomas Jefferson (May 30, 1788), in 3 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 31, 31.
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Madison was not even as hopeful as the great man from Mount
Vernon.
In private correspondence, Madison argued that the
government created by the Constitution was still too weak. Shortly
before the Convention ended, he wrote in secret code to Jefferson,
who was still in France, that the plan of government "will neither
effectually answer its national object nor prevent the local mischiefs
which every where excite disgusts agst the state governments.'1 26 In
late October, he still bemoaned that the Convention had not adopted
his proposal to give Congress a "constitutional negative on the laws of
1' 27
the States.'
Clearly, supporters of the Constitution, who thoroughly
dominated Congress in 1789 when the Bill of Rights was written, had
no intention of undoing their handiwork with a series of debilitating
amendments that would weaken the national government. They
emphatically rejected attempts to undermine the power of the
government to control weapons of war and to suppress a revolution.
For example, they rejected a New Hampshire suggestion for an
amendment to prohibit the creation of a standing army "in time of
Peace unless with the consent of three fourths of the Members of
each branch of Congress."' 128 Though the New York Antifederalists
would have banned standing armies altogether' 2 9 the First Congress
would not accept such a limitation. It refused to compel the nation to
wait until the rebellion had actually started before it could organize
0
an army and step in to disarm another Daniel Shays.13
Not surprisingly, then, when Madison reluctantly and unenthusiastically'3 ' proposed his amendments, he wanted to be certain that
"the structure & stamina of the Govt. [were] as little touched as
possible.' 1 32 He also "limited" his proposed amendments "to points
which are important in the eyes of many and can be objectionable in
those of none.' ' 33 Thus, Madison tried to avoid controversial political
issues affecting the structure of the government and concentrated on
126.

Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Sept. 6,1787), in 10 THE PAPERS OF

JAMES MADISON, supra note 25, at 163, 163-64.

127. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 10 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON, supra note 25, at 206, 212.
128. CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 15, at 17.
129. See id. at 22.
130. Certainly the Southern framers anticipated the possibility of disarming slave rebels,
free blacks, and people who might aid them.
131. See Finkelman, supra note 86.
132. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph, supra note 89, at 219.
133. Id.
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alterations that would preserve individual liberty. He thought that
"[n]othing of a controvertible nature ought to he hazarded" because
that might defeat the amendments and lead to renewed support for a
second convention. 13 4 He told Edmund Randolph that he had
avoided anything of a "controvertible nature" because of the "caprice
& discord of opinions" in the House and Senate, which had to
approve the amendments by a two-thirds vote, and in the state
legislatures, three-fourths of which had to approve the
amendments. 35 The amendments had a "twofold object of removing
the fears of the discontented and of avoiding all such alterations as
would either displease the adverse side, or endanger the success of
13 6
the measure.'
Finally, we must remember that those who created the United
States understood the nature of a revolution-they had participated
in one. In the Declaration of Independence they certainly asserted
the right "to alter or to abolish" any government.'37 But, with a
democratic republic created by the Constitution, the need for a
violent revolution disappeared. Every two years there would be an
opportunity to participate in an orderly process to replace the existing
government. Some of the very early state constitutions, written
during the Revolution itself, not surprisingly endorsed the right of
revolution. However, the framers of 1787 did not endorse such a
right. The Constitution does not have a suicide clause in it, and no
one intended that it should have such a clause. Indeed, as John
Marshall said even before the Convention finished its deliberations,
"nothing but the adoption of some efficient plan from the Convention
can prevent Anarchy first, & civil Convulsions afterwards.' 13 8 After
the Convention, Oliver Ellsworth, who would precede Marshall as
Chief Justice, summed up this position: "Anarchy, or a want of such
government as can protect the interests of the subjects against foreign

134. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (June 21, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 89, at 251, 253.
135. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph, supra note 89, at 219.
136. Letter from James Madison to Samuel Johnston (June 21, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON, supra note 89, at 249, 250; see also Letter from James Madison to Tench Coxe
(June 24, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 89, at 257, 257; Letter from
James Madison to George Nichols (July 5, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra
note 89, at 279, 282.
137. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
138. Letter from James McClurg to James Madison (Aug. 5, 1787), in SUPPLEMENT TO MAX
FARRAND'S THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 116, at 205,
206.
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and domestic injustice, is the worst of all conditions.' 1 39 The goal was
to prevent anarchy, violence, and rebellions. This prevention was
accomplished by controlling the militias and the army and by
retaining the right to limit weapons to those who formed "A well
regulated Militia."
President Jackson made this point clear during the Nullification
Crisis, when warning South Carolina to step back from the brink of
secession and constitutional disaster. Responding to the Palmetto
State's claim to a Revolutionary-era heritage, Jackson reminded the
nullifiers that they were "free members of a flourishing and happy
Union," and that "[t]here [was] no settled design to oppress
[them]. ' 140 Jackson's point, which Lincoln would reiterate to the
South in 1861, was that the Constitution contemplated numerous
ways for unhappy citizens, or even states, to protest federal
legislation, but that these means did not include nullification,
secession, or any other sort of rebellion.
The Constitution provided for a standing army and for the
national government to arm and provide rules and regulations for
state militias, which could be federalized when necessary. The
Second Amendment allows for these state militias, which were "well
regulated" under statutes passed by Congress, but the Amendment
was clearly not designed to insure some sort of permanent
revolutionary potential. Indeed, allowing for armed, unregulated
citizens, who could threaten the public order and the national state,
was unnecessary, unwise, and utterly in conflict with the "more
perfect Union" the framers had created in Philadelphia. The "father
of the Constitution," as Madison is often called, did not draft the Bill
of Rights to undo his hard work at Philadelphia.

VII. ANTIFEDERALIST FEARS OF FEDERAL MILITARY POWER
Antifederalists, of course, thought the Constitution created a
government that was too strong. Hostile to a strong central government, they feared the concentration of power, including military
power, in the hands of the new president and Congress. Among their
many fears, they worried that the military clauses in the Constitution
139. A Landholder IX [Oliver Ellsworth], To the Honorable Gentlemen Chosen to Serve in
the State Convention, CONN. COURANT, Dec. 31, 1787, reprinted in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 514, 515 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1978).
140. Proclamation by Andrew Jackson, President of the United States, supra note 72, at
1216.
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might threaten the states in one of two quite contradictory ways.
Some Antifederalists feared that the ability of the new
government to nationalize the state militias was the first step towards
a military dictatorship. As early as 1783, George Washington had
In his
argued for stronger national control over the militias.
141
Washington argued for
Sentiments on a Peace Establishment,
drawing a select group of men, either as volunteers or draftees, from
the state militias to serve in a national army. 42 As many scholars
have noted, and as his own letters show, Washington had little use for
the militias and would probably have happily seen them wither away
while a trained, professional army maintained the defense of the
nation. 143 Henry Knox, the secretary of war under the Articles of
Confederation, proposed a less drastic form of nationalized training
for the state militias and their removal from the states, when
necessary, for no more than a year at a time. 144 However, such
45
proposed reforms were fruitless, because the states rejected them.1
Virginia tried to institute Washington's modest proposal that militia
officers be chosen on the basis of ability, rather than social class and
146
connections, but that reform fell flat on its face.
The Constitution offered a remedy for these proposals by
allowing for the nationalization of militia training and rules and by
allowing the federalization of the militias under the president's
control when necessary "to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress
But such powers truly
Insurrections and repel Invasions.' ' 47
frightened the Antifederalists.
"Philadelphiensis" feared that the "president general" would be
able to "order... the militia to exercise, and to march when and
where he pleases.' ' 48 In Maryland, an Antifederalist writing as "A
Farmer and Planter," worried that with such a provision, the national
government would levy oppressive taxes and that when people
141.

George Washington, Sentiments on a Peace Establishment, in 26 THE WRITINGS OF

GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES 374, 374 (John C.

Fitzpatrick ed., 1938).
142. See id. at 389-90.
143. See Michael A. Bellesiles, The Origins of Gun Culture in the United States, 1760-1865,
1996 J. AM. HIST. 425, 429; Higginbotham, supra note 76, at 43.
144. See Higginbotham, supra note 76, at 42.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 42-43.
15.
147. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
148. Philadelphiensis IX, PHILADELPHIA FREEMAN'S J., Feb. 6, 1788, reprinted in 16 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 57, 58 (John P.

Kaminski & Gaspare J.Saladino eds., 1986).
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refused to pay them, the
great Lords and Masters ...[would] send the militia of
Pennsylvania, Boston, or any other state or place, to cut [their]
throats, ravage and destroy [their] plantations, drive away [their]
cattle and horses, abuse [their] wives, kill [their] infants,... ravish
[their] daughters, and live in free quarters, until [they] get into a
good humour, and pay all that they may think proper to ask of [the
49
people], and [they] become good and faithful servants and slaves.
The new government would, in effect, be able to federalize the
militia of one state and use it against another. 150 The national
government might also be able to use a local militia, under federal
officers, to attack their neighbors. This ability, the opponents of the
Constitution feared, would be the first step to tyranny.
The next step would be to actually take over the state militias,
ordering them here and there to suppress liberty. Mercy Otis
Warren, writing as "A Columbian Patriot," echoed this fear,
complaining that under the Constitution "the militia of the country,
the bulwark of defence, and the security of national liberty [would] no
longer [be] under the controul of civil authority" but instead would be
under the control of the president and the Senate. 5' Warren, carried
away by her own rhetoric, referred to the president and Senate as
1 52
"the Monarch" and "the aristocracy.' '
While some Antifederalists feared the federalization of the
militia, others feared the national government would simply destroy
the militia. John DeWitt, writing in Massachusetts, complained that
the organizers of the new government "[did] not mean to depend
upon the citizens of the States alone to enforce their powers."' 53
DeWitt argued that the only protection of a free state against tyranny
was "a well regulated militia, composed of the yeomanry of the
country" which had always "been considered as the bulwark of a free

149. A Farmer and Planter, To the Farmers and Planters of Maryland, MD. J., Apr. 1, 1788,
reprintedin 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 10, at 74, 76. Arguments like this
underscore Madison's belief that the Antifederalists were mostly unwilling to pay national
taxes. See Letter from James Madison to Tench Coxe, supra note 39, at 210; see also RUTLAND,
supra note 12, at 301.
150. See Higginbotham, supra note 76, at 47, for similar comments by Patrick Henry, John
Smilie, and Luther Martin.
151. A COLUMBIAN PATRIOT [MERCY OTIS WARREN], OBSERVATIONS ON THE NEW
CONSTITUTION, AND ON THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONVENTIONS, in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-

FEDERALIST, supra note 10, at 270, 277.
152- Id.
153. John DeWitt, Letter V: To the Free Citizens of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
reprintedin 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 10, at 34, 37.
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people."' 514 He worried that the national government would "neglect
to arm, organize and discipline the men" in the state militias, 55 thus
making them weak and ineffective. Then a standing army could
easily defeat the state militias and take over the nation. Similarly,
Brutus, writing in New York, predicted that men would be
15 6
"impressed from the militia" and forced into the national army.
Other Antifederalists tied the taxing power to the creation of a
national army. Brutus devoted an entire essay to the combined
power of the United States "to borrow money... and to raise and
support armies.' 1 57
Indeed, a common theme among many
Antifederalists was the fear of national taxes that would be collected
by military force. One way of accomplishing this end was to cripple
the military and thus prevent the national government from having
the force to suppress tax rebellions. The Antifederalists could not
figure out whether this force would be the federalized militia, as "A
Farmer and a Planter" feared, or a standing army that could easily
defeat a demoralized and untrained state militia, as DeWitt feared.
But, either way, the strong national government, with its strong
military, was the enemy. The plans of Washington outlined in his
8 or the less drastic suggestions
Sentiments on a Peace Establishment,1
of Secretary of War Knox, only confirmed the dangers imposed by
the military clauses of the new constitution. By 1787-88 both men
had become ardent Federalists, and everyone assumed that if the
Constitution were ratified, Washington would be president. The
Antifederalists had strong reasons to fear that the new government
might indeed destroy the state militias.
Thus, the opponents of the Constitution proposed amendments
to limit the national government, including many changes in the
military structure. As we know, these proposals failed to gain any
substantial support in Congress.

VIII.

THE DEBATE IN CONGRESS AND THE LANGUAGE OF THE
AMENDMENT

There is frustratingly little of the Congressional debates over the

154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Brutus VIII, N.Y. J., Jan. 10, 1788, reprinted in 15 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 57, at 335, 336.
157. Id. at 335.
158. Washington, supra note 141, at 374.
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Bill of Rights available to modern scholars. The Senate for this
period kept no records of its debates, but only records of bills,
motions, and votes. The House spent little time on the drafts that
became the Second Amendment. The debate began with Madison's
first draft of the proposed amendment, which stated that, "A well
regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, being the best
security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms
shall not be infringed; but no person religiously scrupulous shall be
compelled to bear arms."' 5 9
The draft language suggests that the framers saw this essentially
as an amendment about the militia; any right to own weapons was a
collective right, derived from the right of each state to maintain a
"well regulated militia." Thus, the amendment talked about "the
body of the people." In drafting the proposed amendment, Madison
was interested in letting the Antifederalists know that the militias
were secure, but also in warning the states not to persecute people on
account of their religious beliefs. Congressional debate over the
Amendment centered almost entirely on the last clause, providing an
exception from militia service for the "religiously scrupulous." In the
end Congress scrapped this clause.
Most of the House debate was lead by two Antifederalists,
Elbridge Gerry and Aedanus Burke. Burke wanted amendments, but
not Madison's, which he asserted in this debate were "frothy and full
of wind, formed only to please the palate; or. .. like a tub thrown out
to a whale, to secure the freight of the ship and its peaceable
voyage."' 160 In addition to their concern over conscientious objectors,
the Antifederalists in the debate made the usual, almost pro forma,
attack on a standing army. Burke, for example, made a futile attempt
to require a two-thirds vote in Congress to create a peacetime
standing army.161 In general the Antifederalists showed their deep
fear of the national government. The Federalists, with the votes to
back them up, said little.
The debaters never sought to clarify the meaning of the words
"to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."
But, the
159. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 87, at 778. See the reprint of the House of
Representatives debate of August 17, 1789, in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 210, 210
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
160. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 87, at 774. On this issue, see generally Bowling, supra
note 23. George Mason thought Madison's proposals were "[m]ilk & [w]ater propositions,"
while Senator Richard Henry Lee dismissed them as "not similar" to the amendments proposed
by the Virginia Ratifying Convention. Id. at 233.
161. See Bowling, supra note 23, at 241.
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overwhelming tenor of the debate is that the Congressmen perceived
this discussion as concerning only the militia. The last clause,
providing an exemption for pacifists, fits with this understanding.
Nowhere in the debate is there the slightest hint about a private or
individual right to own a weapon. This should not surprise us, for as
one of the leading military historians of the period notes, "[i]n all the
discussion and debates" over the Second Amendment, "from the
Revolution to the eve of the Civil War, there is precious little
evidence that advocates of local control of the militia showed an
equal or even a secondary concern for gun ownership as a personal
'
right."162
The records of the state courts and legislatures for this
period reflect this conclusion, as numerous courts accepted the notion
that to "bear arms" was a term solely connected to the militia and the
military. As the Tennessee Supreme Court noted in 1840,163 reflecting
years of experience in the American colonies and states, "the object,
then, for which the right of keeping and bearing arms is secured is the
defence of the public." 164 The term "bear arms" had a "reference to
their military use.1 16 The court further noted that
A man in the pursuit of deer, elk, and buffaloes might carry his rifle
every day for forty years, and yet it would never be said of him that
he had borne arms; much less could it be said that a private citizen
bears arms because he has a dirk or pistol concealed under his
clothes, or a spear in a cane.' 66
Despite the failure of the House to explore the meaning of the
term "bear arms," this first draft does give us an important insight
into the meaning of the term to "bear arms."
Some modern
commentators try to separate this term from the first clause of the
Second Amendment-"A well regulated Militia, being necessary to
the security of a free States" - and argue for an independent federal
right to carry (bear) guns. But, the text of the initial draft shows that
this is not what the term "bear arms" meant at the time. Rather, the
term can only have meaning if it is connected to militia service.
Otherwise, the last clause of the proposed amendment-"but no
person religiously scrupulous shall be compelled to bear arms"would have had no meaning at all. Since no states at the time
required people to carry weapons for personal use, it would have

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Higginbotham, supra note 76, at 40.
Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 154 (1840).
Id. at 158.
Id.
Id. at 161. See generally Bellesiles, supra note 77, at 587.
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been absurd to declare that "religiously scrupulous" people could not
be "compelled to bear arms," if "bear arms" only meant carrying
weapons. No state at the time, nor any state before, had ever
compelled people to carry weapons in their private capacity. Rather,
state governments had only compelled people to carry weapons-to
bear arms-as part of their militia duty. Thus, the term "bear arms"
in the final amendment, if understood as it was at the time of the
drafting, could only have been seen in the context of military
67
service.1
Another insight to this interpretation comes from the New
Hampshire convention. In order to placate the Antifederalist
minority, the Federalists in the New Hampshire convention endorsed
twelve proposed amendments, two of which dealt with military
issues. 168 The tenth proposal provided "[t]hat no standing Army shall
be Kept up in time of Peace unless with the consent of three fourths
of the Members of each branch of Congress, nor shall Soldiers in
Time of Peace be Quartered upon private Houses without the
consent of the Owners.' 1 69 Congress ignored the first clause, which
would have led to a significant diminution of national power. On the
other hand, Congress endorsed the second clause and incorporated it
into what became the Third Amendment.
The other military amendment proposed by the New Hampshire
Federalists is more interesting. The twelfth, and last, on the New
Hampshire list declared that "Congress shall never disarm any
Citizen unless such as are or have been in Actual Rebellion."'71 0 There
are two ways we might interpret "disarm," which of course is the
opposite of "keep and bear arms." If we took this to be an individual
167. The earliest use of "bear arms" supports the notion that the phrase has a military
meaning. Thus, in Beowulf, we find:
As I am informed that this unlovely one
Is careless enough to carry no weapon,
I abjure utterly the bearing of sword.
With naked hands I shall grapple with the fiend,
Fight to the death here, hater and hated!
BEOWULF: AN ADAPTATION BY JULIAN GLOVER OF THE VERSE TRANSLATIONS OF MICHAEL
ALEXANDER AND EDWIN MORGAN 70 (Magnus Magnusson et al. eds., 1988). References to

"taking arms" or "bearing arms" contemporaneous with the adoption of the Bill of Rights are
also found in the context of military service. For example, see 1 WILLIAM ROBERTSON, THE
HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF THE EMPEROR CHARLES THE FIFTH 316 (1857); THE VOIAGE AND
TRAVAILE OF SIR JOHN MAUNDEVILE, KT. 65 (J.O. Halliwell ed., Reeves and Turner 1883)
(1725).
168. See CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 15, at 17.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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right, it would mean that Congress would have been unable to pass a
federal law to disarm convicted felons or indeed people in the process
The Constitution gave Congress full
of committing a crime.
legislative power over the national capital, the territories, and other
Now, it would seem
property owned by the United States.
Federalists, who, as
the
New
Hampshire
preposterous to believe that
"cautious supporters of the Constitution,""' had just voted to ratify
the Constitution, wanted to strip Congress of all power to prevent
crime in its jurisdiction and all power to remove guns from criminals,
pirates, or others threatening the public order, unless they were in
rebellion. However, if we see the language of "disarm any Citizen" as
part of the notion of "bearing arms" for the militia, then the clause is
suddenly reasonable and sensible. The New Hampshire Federalists
were saying, in effect, that Congress cannot disarm the militias-the
civilian based armies of the states-unless they "are or have been in
Actual Rebellion.' 17 2 On another linguistic level this is the only
interpretation that makes any sense. Surely New Hampshire could
not imagine a single citizen, or even a handful of malcontents, being
"in Actual Rebellion." But, the citizens in the militia could be.
Indeed, during Shays's Rebellion, "Some militia units in the insurgent
counties supported the rebels."'7 3 Similarly, in New Hampshire "[a]
less publicized confrontation had occurred" in which "angry debtors
led by militia officers surrounded the building in Exeter where the
legislature was in session.117 4 A day later, militia units from eastern
New Hampshire "dispersed the insurgents."' 75
Thus, the people in New Hampshire understood, from their own
recent history, that the militia could turn on the government and
might have to be disarmed. But surely they did not fear any
government that could take weapons out of the hands of criminals,
pirates, and the like. Thus, the only plausible understanding of New
Hampshire's use of the term "disarm" is in the context of the militia.
In this context, to "keep and bear arms" is a right that is
intrinsically collective-it is the right of the community to "keep and
bear arms" for the purposes of maintaining a "well regulated" militia.
The final insight to the meaning of the language of the Amendment
171. Lawrence Delbert Cress, A Well-Regulated Militia: The Origins and Meaning of the
Second Amendment, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A LIVELY HERITAGE, supra note 97, at 55, 62.
172. CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 15, at 17.
173. Higginbotham, supra note 76, at 43.
174. Id. at 44.
175. Id.
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comes from its structure. No other amendment explains its purpose.
The First Amendment, for example, prohibits Congress from
"abridging the freedom of speech ' 176 but does not contain an
explanation, such as "in order to secure open political debate." Nor
in the Free Exercise Clause did Congress feel the need to say
something like, "in order to prevent religious intolerance, Congress
shall make no law.., prohibiting the free exercise thereof." The
Second Amendment is different. There were calls, such as those from
the Pennsylvania minority, for protection of a personal right to own
weapons for hunting and or other nonmilitary reasons. Congress
clearly rejected this concept, limiting the right "to bear arms"traditionally a phrase tied to military service -to collective service in
the "well regulated Militia."
IX. To BEAR ARMS: A COLLECTIVE OR INDIVIDUAL RIGHT?
Sanford Levinson, in a provocative article,177 dismisses the
collective interpretation of the language in the Second Amendment
with the clever argument that the term "people" must refer to
individuals because that is how the term is used in the Fourth
Amendment. 17 8 This analysis is, in the end, not terribly persuasive.
He notes that the Fourth Amendment uses the term "people" but
that "[i]t is difficult to know how one might plausibly read the Fourth
Amendment as other than a protection of individual rights."' 7 9 This
surely makes sense. But does it prove that the term "people" in the
Second Amendment must also refer to individual rights?
We
certainly know that words in the Constitution can have multiple
meanings.
Consider, for example, the term "people" in the First
Amendment-"Congress shall make no law... prohibiting... the
right of the people peaceably to assemble .... " 81 0 If it is hard to
construe the word "people" in the Fourth Amendment to be anything
but a reference to individuals, it is equally difficult to construe the
term in the First Amendment as anything but a collective right.
Clearly, the idea of the people assembling contemplates a large
176. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
177. Sanford Levinson, The EmbarrassingSecond Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989).
178. See id. at 645. The Fourth Amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
179. Levinson, supra note 177, at 645.
180. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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number of people and not a single person assembling.
Thus, linguistically, the term "people" in the Second
Amendment might be interpreted "either way." Standing alone, the
phrase "the right of the people to keep and bear arms" could apply to
individuals or collectively to "the people." But, unlike the use of the
word in the Fourth Amendment, the Second Amendment ties the
term "people" to a collective entity, the "well regulated Militia"
which is "necessary to the security of a free State."
This
understanding is also supported by the original wording of the
Amendment, which referred to the "body" of the people.
Linguistically, the Amendment can easily be read to concern the
"body" of the people. The Amendment does not say, "individually
armed citizens, being necessary to the security of a free state .... "
The Amendment explicitly refers to the "militia," a collective
organization-and a specific kind of militia at that-one that is "well
regulated." It is hard to imagine individuals being "well regulated"
by the government. They are only "regulated" as a group.
Levinson also poses the clever query: "One might ask why the
Framers did not simply say something like 'Congress shall have no
power to prohibit state-organized and directed militias."" 1 But, we
might just as cleverly turn Levinson's question around. One might
ask, if they intended to protect the individual right to own weapons,
why didn't the framers simply say something like, "Congress shall
have no power to prohibit the private ownership of guns?" Indeed,
that provision was what Antifederalists in much of the country asked
for in their proposed amendments and truly wanted Congress to say.
The fact that Madison refused to adopt such language-and that
Congress did not amend the proposal to add such language -suggests
that the Federalists who were in control of Congress in 1789 did not
intend to create an individual right. Indeed, they added the
explanatory clause at the beginning of the Amendment- "A well
regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free State"-to
make certain that no one would misunderstand their intent.
The internal language of the clause also makes Levinson's
reading, and that of other individual rights proponents, seem absurd.
If the right to keep and bear arms "shall not be infringed," then the
national government presumably has no power, in any of its many
jurisdictions, to disarm anyone. A comparison with the Pennsylvania
state constitution of 1776 illustrates this point. That constitution says
181. Levinson, supra note 177, at 645.
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That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of
themselves and the state; and as standing armies in the time of
peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up; And
that the military should be kept
under strict subordination to, and
182
governed by, the civil power.
Under the Pennsylvania state constitution, the right to bear arms
"for defense of themselves" can be seen as an individual right, but it is
strictly limited to self-defense. 81 3 It does not give one the right to use
arms to commit crimes, to intimidate others, 1 4 to hunt, or even for
recreational target practice. Presumably, as with most other "rights,"
the legislature could impose reasonable limitations on what
constitutes a weapon of "defense."
Unlike the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, the language of
the Second Amendment is absolute: "shall not be infringed." If read
as an individual right, criminals, convicted felons, pirates, or
revolutionaries could all be armed in the District of Columbia or in
the federal territories. Pirates could load up their ships on the
Potomac River and sail out to sea. Hunters could trample through
Yellowstone or some other national park, guns in hand. 85 Anyone
might board a plane, gun in hand, or carry a weapon into Congress,
the White House, or any other federal building. After all, what better
place to exercise your Second Amendment rights, than in front of
your representatives or even in the courts of justice? As absurd as
this would be, such people could not be "disarmed," at least until they
began to commit a crime, if the Second Amendment creates an
individual right to bear arms. Taken to its logical extreme, we might
argue that just as a federal felon, serving time, has some First
Amendment rights to press, petition, and religion, or Eighth
Amendment rights not to be subjected to cruel punishment, so too, a
prisoner might claim some Second Amendment right. The Fifth
Amendment allows the taking of liberty under some circumstances,
while the Second, if read as an individual right, does not.

182. PA. CONST. of 1776, A DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE
COMMONWEALTH, OR STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA art. XIII, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 3082, 3083
(Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909).
183. In the context of the clause it might, however, be seen as a collective right to defend the
community, against rioters or organized criminals, and thus imply that the militia could be called
out for more than defense of the state.
184. Or to frighten a former spouse. See United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598 (N.D.
Tex. 1999).
185. The government could prohibit hunting on federal lands, but, presumably, could not
prohibit carrying weapons on federal lands.
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But, as we have seen, Madison and the huge Federalist majority
in the First Congress rejected any amendments that undermined the
power of the national government. Is it conceivable that they failed
to follow this philosophy with the Second Amendment? That they
meant to implement the demands of the Pennsylvania Antifederalists,
and in effect, eviscerate the power of the national government? Such
an argument goes against the entire history of the period.
Hence, the Second Amendment prevents Congress from
abolishing the organized or "well regulated" state militias. Today
such an argument may seem almost silly. Why, modern Americans
might ask, would Madison bother to promise not to abolish the state
militias, and why would the Antifederalists think this was some sort of
victory, or even a "tub" thrown at them? Madison and his colleagues
provided for an Amendment dealing with the militia because most of
the states that proposed amendments wanted some guarantee that
Congress would not destroy their militias. The states understood that
the power to regulate might imply the power to destroy. John
DeWitt, Luther Martin, and other Antifederalists certainly feared
that the national government would indeed abolish the state militias.
Washington's 1783 Sentiments on a Peace Establishment did not call
for the outright abolition of the militias, but it did call for them to
take a clearly secondary role in the defense of the nation. 86
Moreover, Washington proposed skimming the best militiamen for
national service and leaving in the state militias only those "who from
domestic Circumstances, bodily defects, natural awkwardness or
'
disinclination, can never acquire the habits of Soldiers."' 87
None of the Federalist framers saw it that way; they had no
desire to destroy the state militias, just as they had no desire to
impose a national church on the people, institute cruel and unusual
punishments, or deny people the right against self-incrimination.
Thus, a militia-protecting amendment was completely within the
scope of Madison's desire to add amendments that would not affect
"the structure & stamina of the Govt."' 188 He "limited" his proposed
amendments "to points which are important in the eyes of many and
can be objectionable in those of none.' ' 89 A guarantee that the states
could maintain well-regulated militias-militias which remained

186.
187.
188.
189.

Washington, supra note 141, at 389.
Id.
Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph, supra note 89, at 219.
Id.
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subject to congressional control and federal deployment-did not
conflict with this goal.
Significantly, Madison also limited his "tub" to the
Antifederalists by having the national government only promise not
to dismantle the organized, "well regulated" state militias. This
phrase, "well regulated" further shows that the Amendment does not
apply to just anyone. It does not apply to the "unorganized" militia,
because that militia is certainly not "well regulated." Nor can it apply
to individual citizens who might choose to keep and bear arms "for
the defense of themselves." The Pennsylvania dissenters had wanted
this right, but did not get it. A new mob, led by a new Daniel Shays,
could be disarmed by the national government. Nor does the
Amendment apply to the hunter and sportsman. The majority in the
First Congress intended to reassure the Antifederalists that the
national government would not disarm those who are trained by the
state militia and in that body-the "well regulated Militia."
Supporters of an individual right interpretation of the
Amendment place great emphasis on the term "keep and bear arms."
However, this is clearly a term of art, applied to militias in England
and America, just as criminal indictments at the time used the term of
art "with force and arms." Beyond that, Madison wanted to reassure
the states that their militias would be armed at all times. Without
such a clause, Congress might allow the militias to continue, but
nevertheless disarm them, thus rendering them impotent. This is
what Great Britain had sought in 1775. The British government did
not ban the colonial militias-after all, they were necessary in case of
an invasion, Indian war, or rebellion. But if the militias were
disarmed, as the lobster backs tried to do at Concord, they would be
unable to resist British policy; yet they could nevertheless be called
out, and armed, to protect the empire. The battle on Lexington
Green was fought to prevent the disarming of the local militias, not
their elimination.
The phrase "keep and bear arms" may also reflect the
contemporary disputes over who would provide arms for the state
militias. As noted above, at the Convention, Federalists like Rufus
King argued that Congress had the power to prescribe the kind of
weapons the militia might use and even to buy the weapons for the
militia. As Michael Bellesiles has shown, the militias at this time were
often poorly armed, most white American men did not own arms, and
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there was great resistance among the people to having to arm
themselves. 19° Bellesiles has exposed and undermined the myth that
most Americans owned a firearm. Another indication of the lack of
arms in private hands was a law adopted by Virginia, as the
Revolution was winding down, to require that those mustered out of
service return their weapons to the state.19'
During the ratification debates, the proponents of the
Constitution reiterated the point that Congress would become the
supplier of weapons for the states. Noah Webster, for example,
pointed out that Congress had the "power to provide for the
organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia," although he also
noted that Congress could only call out the militia under certain welldefined circumstances.192 Presumably, the power to "arm" the militia
also included the power not to "arm" the militia. Thus, the Second
Amendment guaranteed that the militias would be armed to head off
the exaggerated fears of some Antifederalists, who believed the
Constitution was the prelude to a military takeover by a standing
army led by the Senate and the president. Not only did Congress lack
the power to disarm the "well regulated" state militias, but if
Congress failed to provide arms for them, presumably the states could
appropriate money for their own arms or even order militia members
to provide their own weapons.
X. MODERN POLICY AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT
Neither in 1787 nor in 1789 did Madison and the Federalists have
any interest in disarming the state militias, just as they had no interest
in imposing a national religion on the American people or denying
accused criminals the right to a jury trial.
Thus, when the
Antifederalists demanded explicit protections on these and other
points, Madison was willing to comply. He was not, however,
interested in changing the power relations created at the Philadelphia
Convention, or in undermining the nation's ability to defend itself
from enemies and criminals, foreign or domestic.
Thus, the Second Amendment protected the right of the states to
190.
191.
Oct. 21,
192.

See Bellesiles, supra note 143, at 428-30.
See An act for the recovery of arms and accoutrements belonging to the state, Act of
1782, ch. XII, 1782 Va. Acts 132.

NOAH WEBSTER, AN EXAMINATION INTO THE LEADING PRINCIPLES OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE LATE CONVENTION HELD AT PHILADELPHIA
(1787), reprinted in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, PUBLISHED
DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788, at 29, 52 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1888).
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maintain and arm their own militias, as long was they were "well
regulated" and ultimately under federal control. The Amendment
was not a suicide clause allowing revolutionaries to create private
militias to overthrow the national government or even to impede the
faithful execution of the law. The Amendment prevented Congress
from abolishing the organized, well-regulated militias of the states.
The Second Amendment does not protect the individual right to
hunt deer, collect antique weapons, go to the firing range, or even
own a licensed pistol. Proponents of the private ownership of hunting
rifles, fishing rods, skinning knives or pistols need not fear this
analysis of the Second Amendment. Such a constitutional protection
was not needed then, and it is not needed today.
Oliver Ellsworth, who would later be Chief Justice of the United
States, found the whole notion of specific protections of liberties silly.
Frustrated by the constant demands for an endless laundry list of
amendments, he argued that
There is no declaration of any kind to preserve the liberty of the
press, etc. Nor is liberty of conscience, or of matrimony, or of burial
of the dead; it is enough that Congress have no power to prohibit
either, and can have no temptation. This objection is answered in
that the states have all the power originally, and Congress have
only what the states grant them.193
Could Congress ban hunting rifles? It would be politically
impossible and constitutionally absurd, although it would be possible
and reasonable to ban hunting, and hunting rifles, in national parks.
May Congress regulate the ownership, sale, use, and interstate
transportation of firearms? Surely it can within the constitutional
limits of general federal police and commerce powers, just as the
states or the national government (where it has regulatory or police
power) can regulate burial, marriage, or child custody. But, just as
regulations of marriage or burial must be reasonable, 194 so too would
regulations of firearms.

193. A Landholder VI, [Oliver Ellsworth], To The Landholders and Farmers, CONN.
COURANT, Dec. 10, 1787, reprintedin 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 139, at 487, 490.

194. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).

